*Ø* Blogmanac | "What To Do With Moqtada Al-Sadr"
Contrary to what we hear about "insurgents" being responsible for the resistance against American forces and deaths of American troops in Iraq, there's quite a bit going on over there that we're not hearing about in our mainstream media. The following past PINR analyses are relevant when understanding the current Shi'a uprising:
''Still No Light at the End of the Tunnel in Iraq''
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=155
''Iraq's Most Pressing Political Issues Have Yet to be Addressed''
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=145
''Al-Sistani's Next Move''
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=136
''Anticipating the Presidential Election, Bush Administration Pulls Troops Out
of Baghdad''
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=147
------------------------------
"What To Do With Moqtada Al-Sadr"
Drafted by Erich Marquardt on April 08, 2004
Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
Pushing Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani into the shadows, Shi'a leader Moqtada al-Sadr has emerged into the Iraqi spotlight, finally flexing his muscles by calling his followers into open confrontation with the United States. Al-Sadr has created a dilemma for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) because his rabid anti-Americanism makes him difficult to negotiate with, yet his large, dedicated following warrants that course.
Al-Sadr, just at the tender age of 31, is the son of respected Shi'a cleric Mohamed Sadeq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party in 1999 due to his outspoken criticism of its policies. The rest of his family -- including his two older brothers and a famous uncle -- were also murdered by Ba'ath Party operatives.
With such big shoes to fill, al-Sadr is hoping to leave his mark on Iraqi society, utilizing the power gained from his prominent family background to rally Iraq's Shi'a together against a common enemy. With the Ba'ath Party dissolved, that enemy has become the new wielder of power in Iraq, the U.S.-led coalition. Hoping to prove to Washington that he is a force that must be contended with, al-Sadr wants to be intimately involved in decisions regarding the future of the Iraqi state.
After the fall of Saddam, al-Sadr quickly worked to fill the newly created power vacuum in Baghdad. In the early days after the U.S.-led invasion, al-Sadr sent his disciples into the Baghdad streets to hand out food and water at a time when social services were either insufficient or non-existent. His private militia, known as the Mehdi Army, provided desperately needed security in Baghdad's Shi'a slums. All of these quick actions undertaken by al-Sadr boosted his reputation in the eyes of Iraq's Shi'a, earning him much more respect than the CPA.
Therefore, when the CPA decided to shut down his newspaper, al-Hawza, there was bound to be a power struggle. It was clear from the start of this struggle which side Iraq's Shi'a would be on.
The justification for shutting down al-Hawza stemmed from the fact that al-Sadr's fiery anti-American rhetoric was becoming increasingly incendiary toward the CPA. Openly criticizing the leadership of the U.S. in Iraq, al-Sadr was beginning to concern Washington policymakers. While he never publicly called his followers into open revolt against CPA troops, he was continuously tarring the image of the CPA, and at the same time buoying his prestige and power in the Shi'a community.
This created a difficult situation for the CPA. The CPA could have chosen to embrace al-Sadr, to offer him a prominent role in the new Iraqi government, but al-Sadr's ideology is so at odds with U.S. interests that Washington was unwilling to go this route. The second option, which is the course that the U.S. has followed since the fall of Saddam, was to simply ignore al-Sadr, and not exacerbate tensions with him. This explains why the United States did little to disarm al-Sadr's Mehdi Army even though the CPA publicly stated that private militias were outlawed in Iraq. However, in recent days, due to the increasing stature of al-Sadr, Washington chose to give up its policy of isolation and move directly against al-Sadr's interests.
Once the CPA shut down al-Hawza, al-Sadr responded with even more anti-American tongue lashing. Washington retaliated by arresting one of his top deputies on a year-old murder charge, which was basically used as an excuse to punish al-Sadr for his anti-American stance. It was then that al-Sadr called for his followers to openly defy U.S.-led troops in the streets of Iraq. This civil uprising among the Shi'a community led to many Iraqi deaths and over a handful of CPA troop losses.
Now, the CPA has put out a warrant for the arrest of al-Sadr, on the same year-old murder charge that his deputy is being held for. Al-Sadr has apparently moved into the city of Najaf, surrounded and protected by his followers and his private militia. It will be very significant to see how Washington decides to proceed from this point. While al-Sadr is an obstacle for the CPA, the alternative of arresting him is bound to create massive unrest in Iraq's Shi'a community. CPA forces are already so taxed and spread so thin that, without a significant influx of new troops, it will have a difficult time quelling any Shi'a uprising as long as attacks in the Sunni Arab areas continue too. Hoping to strengthen his hand, U.S. General John Abizaid has apparently requested more troops from the Pentagon.
Furthermore, while al-Sadr is often scorned by other Shi'a leaders, his movement against the CPA is so popular among Shi'a that other clerics have been very cautious in speaking out against him. For example, the highest religious authority among Iraq's Shi'a, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has called for an end to the violence but said that the motives behind al-Sadr's revolt were "legitimate."
Al-Sadr wants to make it clear that he has the power to alter U.S. plans in Iraq and, because of this power, he expects Washington to compromise on its interests and allow al-Sadr to have a significant role in Iraqi politics. There is no simple way to alleviate the situation and any mistakes made at this point in Iraq's progression could be detrimental to the future success of the U.S.-led reconstruction efforts.
SOURCE
-----
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.
Contrary to what we hear about "insurgents" being responsible for the resistance against American forces and deaths of American troops in Iraq, there's quite a bit going on over there that we're not hearing about in our mainstream media. The following past PINR analyses are relevant when understanding the current Shi'a uprising:
''Still No Light at the End of the Tunnel in Iraq''
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=155
''Iraq's Most Pressing Political Issues Have Yet to be Addressed''
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=145
''Al-Sistani's Next Move''
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=136
''Anticipating the Presidential Election, Bush Administration Pulls Troops Out
of Baghdad''
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=147
------------------------------
"What To Do With Moqtada Al-Sadr"
Drafted by Erich Marquardt on April 08, 2004
Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
Pushing Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani into the shadows, Shi'a leader Moqtada al-Sadr has emerged into the Iraqi spotlight, finally flexing his muscles by calling his followers into open confrontation with the United States. Al-Sadr has created a dilemma for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) because his rabid anti-Americanism makes him difficult to negotiate with, yet his large, dedicated following warrants that course.
Al-Sadr, just at the tender age of 31, is the son of respected Shi'a cleric Mohamed Sadeq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party in 1999 due to his outspoken criticism of its policies. The rest of his family -- including his two older brothers and a famous uncle -- were also murdered by Ba'ath Party operatives.
With such big shoes to fill, al-Sadr is hoping to leave his mark on Iraqi society, utilizing the power gained from his prominent family background to rally Iraq's Shi'a together against a common enemy. With the Ba'ath Party dissolved, that enemy has become the new wielder of power in Iraq, the U.S.-led coalition. Hoping to prove to Washington that he is a force that must be contended with, al-Sadr wants to be intimately involved in decisions regarding the future of the Iraqi state.
After the fall of Saddam, al-Sadr quickly worked to fill the newly created power vacuum in Baghdad. In the early days after the U.S.-led invasion, al-Sadr sent his disciples into the Baghdad streets to hand out food and water at a time when social services were either insufficient or non-existent. His private militia, known as the Mehdi Army, provided desperately needed security in Baghdad's Shi'a slums. All of these quick actions undertaken by al-Sadr boosted his reputation in the eyes of Iraq's Shi'a, earning him much more respect than the CPA.
Therefore, when the CPA decided to shut down his newspaper, al-Hawza, there was bound to be a power struggle. It was clear from the start of this struggle which side Iraq's Shi'a would be on.
The justification for shutting down al-Hawza stemmed from the fact that al-Sadr's fiery anti-American rhetoric was becoming increasingly incendiary toward the CPA. Openly criticizing the leadership of the U.S. in Iraq, al-Sadr was beginning to concern Washington policymakers. While he never publicly called his followers into open revolt against CPA troops, he was continuously tarring the image of the CPA, and at the same time buoying his prestige and power in the Shi'a community.
This created a difficult situation for the CPA. The CPA could have chosen to embrace al-Sadr, to offer him a prominent role in the new Iraqi government, but al-Sadr's ideology is so at odds with U.S. interests that Washington was unwilling to go this route. The second option, which is the course that the U.S. has followed since the fall of Saddam, was to simply ignore al-Sadr, and not exacerbate tensions with him. This explains why the United States did little to disarm al-Sadr's Mehdi Army even though the CPA publicly stated that private militias were outlawed in Iraq. However, in recent days, due to the increasing stature of al-Sadr, Washington chose to give up its policy of isolation and move directly against al-Sadr's interests.
Once the CPA shut down al-Hawza, al-Sadr responded with even more anti-American tongue lashing. Washington retaliated by arresting one of his top deputies on a year-old murder charge, which was basically used as an excuse to punish al-Sadr for his anti-American stance. It was then that al-Sadr called for his followers to openly defy U.S.-led troops in the streets of Iraq. This civil uprising among the Shi'a community led to many Iraqi deaths and over a handful of CPA troop losses.
Now, the CPA has put out a warrant for the arrest of al-Sadr, on the same year-old murder charge that his deputy is being held for. Al-Sadr has apparently moved into the city of Najaf, surrounded and protected by his followers and his private militia. It will be very significant to see how Washington decides to proceed from this point. While al-Sadr is an obstacle for the CPA, the alternative of arresting him is bound to create massive unrest in Iraq's Shi'a community. CPA forces are already so taxed and spread so thin that, without a significant influx of new troops, it will have a difficult time quelling any Shi'a uprising as long as attacks in the Sunni Arab areas continue too. Hoping to strengthen his hand, U.S. General John Abizaid has apparently requested more troops from the Pentagon.
Furthermore, while al-Sadr is often scorned by other Shi'a leaders, his movement against the CPA is so popular among Shi'a that other clerics have been very cautious in speaking out against him. For example, the highest religious authority among Iraq's Shi'a, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has called for an end to the violence but said that the motives behind al-Sadr's revolt were "legitimate."
Al-Sadr wants to make it clear that he has the power to alter U.S. plans in Iraq and, because of this power, he expects Washington to compromise on its interests and allow al-Sadr to have a significant role in Iraqi politics. There is no simple way to alleviate the situation and any mistakes made at this point in Iraq's progression could be detrimental to the future success of the U.S.-led reconstruction efforts.
SOURCE
-----
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.
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